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FIRST CIRCUIT PATCHES JUDGE POSNER'S LEAK
IN THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp.
26 F.3d 1195 (lst Cir. 1994)
Rebecca Cagle Evors
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where its inhabitants have become increasingly concerned about en-
vironmental issues, "[o]ne of the greatest challenges facing the American [insur-
ance] industry today deals with the major threat of pollution-related
environmental liability."1 After Congress enacted the federal Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA]2
to commence a nationwide cleanup of America's threatening hazardous waste
sites, private and governmental parties began bringing actions under CERCLA
against manufacturers who were responsible for creating the hazardous waste
sites.3
In response to the escalating amount of legal disputes involving environmental
liability, the insurance industry, which had provided its insureds with general lia-
bility policies prior to the enactment of CERCLA, sought to limit its liability to
provide coverage to insureds who were guilty of violating CERCLA.' As a result,
the industry drafted an exclusion which barred coverage for damage that occurred
as a result of insureds' intentional acts of pollution.' The pollution exclusion clause
became an important part of every standard general liability policy and contained
only one exception -the sudden and accidental exception. I The standard pollution
exclusion clause reads: "[I]nsurance does not apply to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge. . . of. . . contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land. . . ; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge. . . is sudden
and accidental."7 It is this exclusion, together with its only exception, that has be-
come the subject matter of an endless amount of litigation8 and the topic of numer-
ous articles and other published materials.
1. EMERIC FISCHER & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW § 5.09[A], at 659 (2d ed. 1994).
2.42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
3. See IA FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 4A.02, 4A-18 (1994). The "Superfund
Law" provided billions of dollars necessary to clean up hazardous waste sites for which owners would not take
responsibility. Id.
4. See FISCHER & SWISHER, supra note 1, § 5.091A], at 660.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 8.02[1], at 8-6 to 8-7 (Michael
B. Gerrard ed., 1994) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
8. See FISCHER & SWISHER, supra note 1, § 5.09[A], at 660-61; see also infra note 150.
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Most opinions and analyses concentrate on the interpretation of "sudden and ac-
cidental" and attempt to clear up the confusion these otherwise ordinary words
have caused in the legal arena. This Note, however, will focus on a more narrow
issue involving the pollution exclusion's language which until recently has not been
the subject of judicial attention.
The Note will examine the most recent case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp. ,' and three otherjudicial opinions among the federal
circuit courts of appeals which have interpreted the term "discharge" as it is used in
the pollution exclusion clause. Furthermore, the Note will compare the different
interpretations of "discharge," specifically, the inconsistent opinions on whether
or not the placement of waste materials into an unlined earthen pit is a discharge
into the land; analyze other issues related to interpreting this term; and, finally,
relate how different interpretations affect the industry and its insureds.
A. Terminology
Throughout the discussion in the Note, different phrases are used to describe
the same action; "initial discharge," "initial placement," and "primary discharge"
are all phrases which describe the first action taken by the insured to dispose of the
waste. In all cases discussed in the Note, the insured placed waste materials into a
pit dug in the ground. This placement was the initial (primary) discharge of pollu-
tants. After the waste was placed into the pit, the waste leaked through the bottom
of the pit and seeped into the surrounding environment causing damage. This sub-
sequent leakage is referred to in the Note as the "secondary" or "intermediate" dis-
charge.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Warwick Dyeing Corporation was "in the business of dyeing, finishing and
coating synthetic and synthetic-natural fiber blend fabrics."1 The processes in-
volved in Warwick's business produced waste which contained certain hazardous
substances. 11 To dispose of these waste materials, Warwick, in July of 1979, em-
ployed ACME Services, Inc. to gather the waste from Warwick's west plant and
carry it away to a disposal site. 2 ACME carried Warwick's waste to a duly li-
censed disposal site, the L & RR Site, where ACME disposed of the waste into the
landfill.13
Although evidence did not show that Warwick had actual knowledge of how
ACME disposed of the waste, a truck driver for ACME testified that he disposed
of the waste by discharging it "directly into the landfill by opening a drain valve on
his truck and letting the waste pour onto the ground."14 No private or governmen-
9. 26 F3d 1195 (Ist Cir. 1994).
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tal party charged Warwick or ACME with improperly discharging Warwick's
waste materials. 5 The Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA],
however, did notify Warwick on September 18, 1989, of resulting contamination
at the L & RR Site.16 With respect to the contamination, the EPA labeled Warwick
as a" 'responsible party' "since it had contracted with ACME for ACME to haul
Warwick's waste and dispose of it at the L & RR Site. 7 The EPA stated that
[u]nder CERCLA, a person that generates hazardous substances and arranges for
their disposal is strictly liable, regardless of whether the person was at fault or
whether the substance actually caused or contributed to any damage, for all costs of
remediating environmental damages at the site where the substances ultimately are
disposed. 18
On June 29 of the following year, the EPA demanded in an administrative order
that Warwick and twenty-four other respondents take remedial actions to "monitor
and prevent the further release of hazardous substances" at the L & RR Site. 9
Also, the EPA ordered Warwick and the other respondents to reimburse the EPA
for the costs it incurred from undertaking activities first to remedy the contamina-
tion that had previously occurred at the L & RR Site and second to prevent any
additional releases.20
Later, on July 25, 1991, a group of plaintiffs, whom the EPA had named as
"'potentially responsible part[ies]' ('PRP[s]'),' "21 sued Warwick, along with
forty-six other respondents, for recovery of the costs they incurred pursuant to fol-
lowing the EPA's order for remedial action at the L & RR Site.22 The group of
PRPs alleged that Warwick was "jointly and severally liable for having 'arranged
for the disposal of hazardous substances' at the site."23 Subsequently, Warwick and
the group settled; Warwick paid the plaintiffs $40,000 and assigned them its in-
surance rights under its policy with St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company
[hereinafter St. Paul]. 24
St. Paul, Warwick's general liability insurance carrier, denied coverage to
Warwick when Warwick sought "defense costs, and possibly, indemnity coverage
for the claims made by the EPA and the private plaintiffs."25 On January 27, 1991,
St. Paul brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
indemnify Warwick or defend it against the private and governmental claims .26 St.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1198.
18. Id. at 1197-98 (referring to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
19. Id. at 1198.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1197.




26. Id. at 1198-99.
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Paul and Warwick moved for summary judgment, and the federal magistrate rec-
ommended to the district court that it should enter a judgment for St. Paul.27 The
federal magistrate held that Warwick was barred from coverage "because the dis-
charge of pollutants at the L & RR Site was neither 'sudden' nor 'accidental' as re-
quired by the exception" to the pollution exclusion clause in Warwick's policy.28
On March 18, 1993, the district court issued an order and adopted the magistrate's
recommendation.29 The district court later recalled its order and vacated the judg-
ment in favor of St. Paul in response to Warwick's motion for reconsideration "in
light of 'newly discovered evidence' regarding representations made to state insur-
ance regulatory authorities about the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause."30
However, on June 4, 1993, subsequent to additional briefing, the district court en-
tered a judgment in favor of St. Paul pursuant to the magistrate's recommenda-
tion. 1
III. HISTORY AND LAW
A. CERCLA and Its Interface with State Insurance Law
In 1980, Congress, acting upon its concern for the threat hazardous waste
posed to the country, enacted CERCLA, also known as the" 'Superfund Law.' "32
CERCLA provides that any person who either owns or possesses hazardous sub-
stances and arranges for the disposal or treatment of such hazardous substances is
liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State . . . ; any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person. . .; [and] damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natu-
ral resources" when there is a release of the hazardous substances "or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs.
'33
Before CERCLA was enacted," 'comprehensive general liability' (CGL)" pol-
icies were sold and provided the policyholder with "broad coverage for accidental
personal injury or property damage (including injuries arising from pollution inci-
dents) .3' However, as they later became aware of the potentially enormous
amount of hazardous waste litigation, insurance companies sought to limit the
27. Id. at 1199.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. "Warwick argue[d] [on appeal] that St. Paul should be estopped or barred from applying the pollution
exclusion to the facts of this case because of alleged representations that were made by various parties to state
insurance regulatory authorities." Id. at 1205.
31. Id. at 1199. On the procedural issue of regulatory estoppel, the court held that Warwick was barred from
raising the estoppel issue on appeal since Warwick had neglected to raise this issue initially to the district court.
Id. at 1205. The court could not find an exception to this rule since no " 'egregious circumstances' or 'miscar-
riages ofjustice' "or other "special circumstances" existed to allow the court the opportunity to decide the issue
of estoppel initially raised on appeal. Id. at 1206.
32. GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02 [ I ] [a], at 4A- 144.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), (a)(4)(A-C) (1988). CERCLA in its entirety is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
75(1988).
34. GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[5][d], at 4A- 148.4 to 4A-148.5.
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coverage of their policyholders' liabilities.36 Thus, in 19733" the" 'pollution exclu-
sion' "clause became a part of the standard CGL policy and "limit[ed] coverage to
sudden and accidental pollution incidents."37 A standard pollution exclusion clause
contains the following language:
[I]t is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irri-
tants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere, or any water-
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental. 
38
Judicial opinions are inconsistent on whether a policyholder is barred from cov-
erage for his liabilities arising under CERCLA .3 Among the courts there is a split
of authority since state law governs contract interpretation, and, thus, states are
free to make their own decisions about issues arising under the pollution exclusion
clause.4"
B. CERCLA Litigation: Interpretation of "Sudden and Accidental"and
the Focus on the Act, Not the Resulting Damage
Currently, most insurance litigation involving the issue of coverage for hazard-
ous-waste-cleanup is centered around the interpretation of the original pollution
exclusion clause, drafted in the early 1970s, and its sudden and accidental excep-
tion.41 Insurers argue that terms "sudden" and "accidental" contain a temporal ele-
ment; "[ijnsureds argue that sudden and accidental is synonymous with
unintended and unexpected."'" Among the courts, there is a split of authority as to
the correct interpretation of "sudden" and "accidental."'"
For example, in Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. ," Broderick Investment Company [hereinafter BIC] had an insurance policy
with Hartford which contained the standard pollution exclusion clause;45 thus,
BIC would be excluded from coverage if the damaging contamination at its plant
property" 'ar[ose] out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of. . .pollu-
tants into or upon the land.' "46 However, if BIC fell within the "sudden and acci-
35. Id. § 4A.02[5][d], at 4A-148.5.
36. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, at 8-6.
37. GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[5][d].
38. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, at 8-6 to 8-7 (emphasis added). The emphasis here is added to mark
the standard exception to the pollution exclusion clause.
39. ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 296 (West 1992).
40. Id.
41. See GRAD, supra note 3, § 4A.02[d].
42. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, § 8.04[7], at 8-24.
43. See id. at 8-26; see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
44. 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
45. Broderick, 954 F2d at 606.
46. See id.
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dental" exception to the pollution exclusion, Hartford would be responsible to
provide BIC coverage for the damage.47 Before making its determination of
whether or not BIC should be afforded coverage under its CGL policy, the Tenth
Circuit waited until the Colorado Supreme Court decided Hecla Mining Co. v. New
Hampshire Insurance Co.," a case similar to Broderick.49 In Hecla, the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase" 'sudden and accidental' "" to mean unex-
pected and unintended."" The Hecla Court also asserted that the "pollution exclu-
sion clause focuses on . . . the discharge of pollution" and not the damage that
results from the discharge. 1 Applying the Colorado Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of "sudden and accidental" to the insured's actions and not the resulting dam-
age, the Tenth Circuit held that the discharge of waste materials into the pits in the
land was intentional and expected; thus, BIC did not fall within the exception to
the pollution exclusion. 2
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. , " the Tenth Circuit again reached the same result as in Broderick-judgment
in favor of insurer -but did so by applying a different interpretation of the phrase
"sudden and accidental." 4 The Tenth Circuit was able to adopt a different interpre-
tation since it was required to follow Utah law and the Utah Supreme Court had
not previously determined the meaning of "sudden and accidental" in pollution
exclusion clauses.55 After looking to Utah appellate courts, other federal courts,
and other circuits, the Tenth Circuit held that" 'sudden and accidental' in the pol-
lution exclusion means abrupt or quick and unexpected or unintended in the con-
text of Utah law."56 The court's holding was based on its belief that the term
"'sudden' include [d] a temporal element, and [was] joined conjunctively with 'ac-
cidental.' "" This method of interpretation eradicated the ambiguity that other
courts believed existed in the language of the pollution exclusion clause.5 8 Al-
though there was a split of authority as to the meaning of "sudden" and "acciden-
47. Id.
48. 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
49. Broderick, 954 F.2d at 604.
50. Id. at 605 (quoting Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1092).
51. Id. at 607 (quoting Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1088-89 n.7) (alteration in original).
52. Id. at 608.
53. 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.) (Hunter, District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411
(1992).
54. See Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1491-92.
55. Id. at 1487.
56. Id. at 1487, 1492 (emphasis omitted).
57. Id. at 1492. This court's interpretation is contrary to that of the Third Circuit. Id. at 1488-89. The Third
Circuit in New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1991), held
that using the conjunctive "and" to join the words "sudden" and "accidental" did not" 'inject[ I a temporal ele-
ment, such as brevity or abruptness, into the exception to the pollution exclusion clause.' "Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1489 (Hunter, District Judge, sitting by desig-
nation) (quoting New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1194-95), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
58. Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1489. On the issue of ambiguity, the Tenth Circuit quoted the Third Circuit's opin-
ion in New Castle:" '[Tlhe existence of more than one dictionary definition is not the sine qua non of ambiguity. If
it were, few words would be unambiguous.' "Id. at 1489 n.6 (quoting New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1193).
[Vol. 15:431
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tal," almost all of the federal courts, as the Tenth Circuit noted, agreed that it is the
discharge and not the resulting damage that must be sudden and accidental .5
In contrast to the two opinions from the Tenth Circuit, Judge Posner, writing for
the Seventh Circuit, circumvented a detailed analysis of the interpretation of "sud-
den" and "accidental."6" In Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. ,61 Posner
merely stated that the discharges of pollutants were" 'sudden and accidental' in the
sense of unintended and unexpected, which is the meaning that Wisconsin's high-
est court [had] impressed upon those words."62 Employing this definition of "sud-
den and accidental" was not the unusual aspect of Posner's opinion, for the Tenth
Circuit in Broderick, as noted above, also interpreted these terms to mean "unin-
tended and unexpected."6 The interesting point of departure in Posner's opinion
was that he focused the sudden and accidental exception on the discharges that oc-
curred subsequent to insured's initial act of disposing of pollutants.64 Posner con-
sidered the secondary (subsequent) discharges of contaminants from their
containers, an unlined earthen pit and barrels buried in the ground, to be the rele-
vant discharges: "[T]he only discharges," Posner stated, "were the unintended and
unexpected consequences of the defective containers in which the pollutants had
been placed."65 By focusing on the "consequences" of the initial discharges, the
placement of wastes into the containers, Chief Judge Posner entered judgment in
favor of the insured.66
Although there was some disagreement as to the meaning of "sudden and acci-
dental" under state law, essentially, prior to the Posner opinion, there was general
agreement that the relevant discharge within the meaning of the pollution exclu-
sion clause was the initial placement of pollutants into earthen pits.67 As will be
seen, Posner rejected this entire line of cases by finding that there was no relevant
discharge until the pollutants leaked through the bottom of the pit into the sur-
rounding environment.
68
C. A New Front in CERCLA Litigation:
Interpreting the Term 'Discharge"
What constitutes the relevant discharge is a recent challenge to coverage under
the pollution exclusion clause.69 Some argue that the secondary discharge, such as
the "subsequent leaching" of contaminants from a landfill, is the relevant dis-
59. Id. at 1491.
60. Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1994).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 703 (citing Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 570-71 (1990)).
63. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
64. Patz, 15 F.3d at 703-05.
65. Id. at 705.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
69. [Defense Research Institute, Inc.] Defense Practice Seminar, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Claims 421 C, A-42 (Oct. 6-7, 1994) (on file with Mississippi College Law Review) [hereinafter Defense Practice
Seminar].
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charge, and, thus, the initial placement of wastes into the environment was not in-
tended to be the focus of the sudden and accidental exception.7"
In Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. ,7 the Patz family manufactured
farm equipment and expanded its operation to include painting the equipment be-
fore sale.72 Painting the equipment produced two by-products: paint sludge and
water contaminated by phosphate.73 Hired consultants advised the Patzes to put
the paint sludge into barrels and then carry the barrels to the town dump where
they would be burned or buried.74 The Patzes followed this advice, but when the
Department of Natural Resources [hereinafter Department] ordered the Patzes to
remove the barrels from the dump, the Patzes carried the barrels back to their own
property where they buried them.75 To dispose of the contaminated water, the con-
sultants suggested that the Patzes create an evaporation pit.76 By pouring the waste
water into an open pit dug in the ground, the Patzes could easily remove the solid
phosphate from the bottom of the pit once the water evaporated.77 This was a well-
accepted method in the waste-disposal community and was expected to be an ef-
fective method of waste-disposal for the Patzes.78 It was thought that the phosphate
would not contaminate the soil beneath the pit since the water would evaporate be-
fore it could penetrate the dense clay soil.79
The Department later investigated the Patzes' operation, whereupon it discov-
ered that seepage of pollutants from the pit had contaminated the groundwater and
the leakage of sludge from buried barrels had contaminated the soil.8" Although
the contamination had not spread beyond the Patzes' premises, the Patzes were
forced to expend $400,000 to remove the barrels, along with some of the soil un-
derneath them, and a considerable amount of soil beneath the evaporation pit.8"
The clean-up was ordered by the Department, and the Patzes sought to recover the
cost from their insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company.82
St. Paul refused to reimburse the Patzes for their clean-up cost for two rea-
sons.83 First, St. Paul contended that the Patzes' depositing of the waste water into
the pit dug in the ground and burying of the barrels containing paint sludge consti-
tuted" 'discharge[s]' of waste materials into the land";84 thus, the pollution exclu-
sion clause found in the Patzes' liability insurance policy excluded them from
70. Id.
71. 15 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1994).
72. Id. at 701.
73. Id. at 701-02.
74. Id. at 702.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 701.
77. Id.
78. Id.







FIRST CIRCUIT PA TCHES JUDGE POSNER'S LEAK
coverage.85 Second, St. Paul claimed that the Patzes' discharges of waste materials
did not fall within the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion
clause since their discharges were intentional and not accidental.8"
In Patz, the Seventh Circuit did not narrowly construe the pollution exclusion
clause language to exclude from coverage only insureds who deliberately pollute
and cause harm.87 The Seventh Circuit instead used an "intermediate interpreta-
tion . . .[and] distinguish[ed] between deliberately discharging waste materials
into land. . . whether or not 'harm' [was] intended, and placing those materials in
a container that [was] buried in land . . . and subsequently leaks or breaks, dis-
charging waste materials into the land or water surrounding the container."88
Applying this interpretation, the court viewed the barrels and, surprisingly, the
evaporation pit as containers which later leaked contaminants into the surrounding
land and water.89 Chief Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, explained
why the unlined earthen pit was a container, not just a hole dug into the land;
Posner reasoned that the clay soil was a "building material," and, hence, the evap-
oration pit was a "containing structure, despite its lack of artificial materials.""
Seeing the barrels as containers was easier; instead of just dumping the paint
sludge directly on the ground, the Patzes placed the sludge into barrels, which
were not themselves contaminants, and buried the barrels under the Patz prop-
erty.91 Since the evaporation pit and barrels were containers, discharging the
wastes into the unlined pit and burying the sludge barrels were not discharges into
or upon land.92 Therefore, the court considered irrelevant the Patzes' intentions at
the time they initially placed their wastes into the pit and buried the barrels of
sludge.93
Ruling out the Patzes' initial discharge of waste materials, the court held that
the relevant discharges were the subsequent occurrences of waste water leaching
through the bottom of the evaporation pit and sludge leaking through the barrels
into the surrounding environment.94 Consequently, the Patzes were not excluded
from coverage since they fell within the sudden and accidental exception to the
pollution exclusion clause: the discharge of pollutants, the leakage from defective
containers (the evaporation pit and barrels), was "sudden and accidental in the
special sense of unintended and unexpected."" The court, perhaps hinting at the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 703.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 703-04.
90. Id. at 704.
91. Id. at 703.
92. Id. at 704.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 703-04.
95. Id. at 704. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "sudden" and "accidental" was that of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which gave this meaning to the terms in Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573
(1990). Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1994).
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absurdity that the discharge of contaminants could be anything but "sudden and
accidental," even commented that generally landowners do not intentionally pol-
lute their own land.9" St. Paul was held liable to reimburse the Patzes for the ex-
penses they incurred.97
Distinguishable from Chief Judge Posner's interpretation of "discharge" in Patz,
Judge Tacha, writing for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, opined on the issue of
what constitutes a "discharge" under the pollution exclusion clause in Broderick In-
vestment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.98 In Broderick, BIC succeeded
to the rights and obligations of Broderick Wood Products, Inc. [hereinafter BWP]
after BWP dissolved in 1982." 9 Prior to its dissolution, BWP was in the business
of "pressure-treating wood products such as telephone poles and railroad ties with
either creosote or pentachlorophenol; steam-cleaning the impregnated wood; and
disposing of the residue chemicals, oils, and water.""' Since the residue waste ma-
terials were mostly water, BWP disposed of the waste by dumping it into "unlined
pits located" on BWP's property.'01 BWP's expectation was that the water would
evaporate and leave a sludge on the bottom of the pit. 02
However, BWP's disposal method was not successful in preventing contamina-
tion: "By mid-1983, it was conclusively determined that contaminants from the
pits were seeping into the soil and groundwater.""1 3 In 1986, the EPA sued BIC to
recover costs it incurred in responding to the environmental contamination and
any costs it would incur in cleaning up the BWP property.104 BIC sought coverage
from Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company [hereinafter Hartford], which had
"provided BWP with CGL policy coverage from 1976 until 1982 and insured BIC
from 1982 until 1984. " 'l s The insurance policy that BIC had obtained from Hart-
ford contained the standard pollution exclusion clause and sudden and accidental
exception to the exclusion.' 06 Adopting the Colorado Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of "sudden and accidental" as "unexpected and unintended," the Tenth Circuit
was left to determine another issue arising under the pollution exclusion clause as
it believed the Colorado Supreme Court would.107
Faced with the decision whether or not BWP's discharge of pollutants was "sud-
den and accidental,"108 the Tenth Circuit first had to determine what was the rele-
96. Patz, 15 F.3d at 705.
97. See id.
98. 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.) (Bratton, District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189
(1992).
99. Broderick, 954 F2d at 603. Throughout this opinion, the Tenth Circuit refers to BIC making the discharge





104. Id. at 604.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 606.
107. Id. at 605.
108. Id. at 608.
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vant discharge.1"9 Judge Tacha, writing for the court, noted that it was an
acceptable method of interpretation under Colorado law to look to dictionary defi-
nitions of the terms "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" in order to "construe
these words according to their plain and ordinary meaning."11 The district court
had agreed with BIC's position that the relevant discharge was the seepage of the
pollutants from the pits into the soil and groundwater and not BWP's initial place-
ment of waste materials into the pits. 111 On appeal, BIC defended this position and
urged "that the term 'discharge' may be interpreted reasonably to mean 'to let go,'
'release from confinement' or 'to give outlet to.' "112 Even by employing these defi-
nitions, Judge Tacha determined that the relevant discharge was still the initial
placement of waste into the pits; these pits were dug into the land, and BWP dis-
charged pollutants "into or upon the land." '113 "[A]ny other interpretation," Tacha
stated, "runs counter to common sense, plain meaning, and ordinary usage.'114
On another point of interpretation, Judge Tacha wrote that since the conjunc-
tion "or" joined the four terms, BWP's disposal of the waste into the pits was the
relevant act as long as any of the four words unambiguously described the act.'
Judge Tacha concluded that BWP's disposal of the "residue chemicals, oil, and wa-
ter"116 into the pits was an act unequivocally described by "the phrase 'discharge
. . . into or upon the land.' "117
Furthering its argument that the initial placement of wastes into the holding
ponds was not the relevant discharge, BIC contended on appeal that the ponds
were better characterized as containers since at least one pond, the main pond,
was partially lined with cement and a natural clay layer formed the bottom of
every pit.118 Judge Tacha reasserted the Tenth Circuit's position that placing the
waste materials into the holding ponds was a discharge " 'into or upon the
land.' "119 Moreover, Tacha noted that the court reached the same conclusion
"[e]ven when [it] view[ed] the evidence in a light most favorable to BIC and
adopt[ed] BIC's characterizations as true."120
Similarly, in response to BIC's contention that BWP intended to contain the
waste in the pits and not for the pollutants to seep from the pits into the soil and
groundwater,121 Judge Tacha enunciated the Colorado Supreme Court's holding in
Hecla: ' "[T]he pollution exclusion clause focuses on whether the discharge of p01-
109. Id. at 606-07.
110. Id. at 607.
111. Id. at 606-07.




116. Id. at 603.
117. Id. at 607.
118. Id. at 607 n.5 (alteration in original).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 607.
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lution was unexpected and unintended.' "122 BIC was incorrect to apply the re-
quirement of intent to the damages that resulted from the discharge. 123 The Tenth
Circuit, however, applied the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of "sudden
and accidental" correctly to BWP's initial actions and determined that BWP in-
tended and expected to discharge the waste materials into the pits in the land.124
Thus, the circuit court concluded that under the terms of the CGL policy BIC did
not fall within the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion and
was, therefore, excluded from coverage."12
Almost four months after the Tenth Circuit had decided Broderick, the court
again was faced with the same pollution exclusion issue. In Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,"' the insured, El Paso,
had "operated a gas transmission system" for fifteen years.127 The operation of this
system produced waste materials in the form of liquid wastes and lubricants. 128 For
disposal of these materials, El Paso dumped the wastes onto the ground and into
unlined pits dug in the ground.129 Although at the time El Paso disposed of the
waste materials it had no knowledge that the liquid wastes and lubricants con-
tained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), El Paso was later held liable for the $6.6
million dollar clean-up costs its successor incurred as a result of remedying the
PCB contamination. 13' El Paso sought indemnification from its insurer Hartford,
but Hartford refused coverage and claimed that El Paso was barred from coverage
because El Paso did not fall within the sudden and accidental exception to the pol-
lution exclusion clause.
131
Judge Moore, writing for the Tenth Circuit, paralleled issues in Hartford to
those in Broderick and concluded that the relevant discharge was the initial dis-
posal of liquid waste into the unlined pits in the ground, not any later release or
seepage into the environment; the disposal was a "continuous and routine...
practice" that El Paso had been operating for years.132 Thus, El Paso did not fall
within the exception to the pollution exclusion clause since its discharge was nei-
ther sudden (abrupt) nor accidental (unexpected) .133 Also, by using the same par-
allelism, Judge Moore held that it was irrelevant whether or not El Paso intended to
122. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088-
89 n.7 (Colo. 199 1)).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 608.
125. Id.
126. 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.) (Hunter, District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411
(1992).
127. Hartford, 962 E2d at 1486.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1486-87.
131. Id. at 1487.
132. Id. at 1491-92.
133. Id.
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cause the damage because the focal point of the sudden and accidental exception is
the initial discharge. 
134
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp. ,' the First
Circuit Court of Appeals joined the considerable group of courts that had studied
the "oft-litigated pollution exclusion clause commonly found in general liability in-
surance policies. ""' Although the First Circuit had the security of knowing that
regardless of its holding it would have the support of a "sizeable number of...
courts," the court joined the ranks of those courts which "narrowly constru[ed] the
breadth of coverage" provided to the policyholder under the pollution exclusion
clause and ruled in favor of the insurer.
137
After interpreting the insurance contract between Warwick and St. Paul, the
district court held that "Warwick's claims [were] excluded from coverage as a mat-
ter of law."1 The First Circuit, in its review de novo of the district court's deci-
sion, was governed by Rhode Island law;' case law in Rhode Island established
that judicial construction should be used in interpreting insurance policies only
when the terms of the policy are found to be ambiguous.' 40 Although courts should
not "seek out ambiguity," .[Ilanguage that is found to be ambiguous or capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation will be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer."141
Since the Rhode Island courts had not yet considered the pollution exclusion
clause, the First Circuit relied on Rhode Island's standards for contract construc-
tion and decisions from other jurisdictions which used the same principles in inter-
preting insurance contracts'42 In deciding one issue, however, the First Circuit
relied on its holding inA. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. "4 where it
had applied Maine law.1" The First Circuit in A. Johnson held that the insurer
bears the burden of proving "that the pollution exclusion applies" and that the in-
sured was responsible for proving that he fell within the exception to the pollution
exclusion clause and was, therefore, entitled to coverage. 4 The insured bore this
additional burden of proof since he also carried the burden of proving that he was
covered under an insurance policy.146 Thus, the First Circuit held that Warwick
134. See id. at 1491.
135.26 F.3d 1195 (lstCir. 1994).
136. Id. at 1197.
137. Id.





143,933 F.2d 66,76 n. 14 (Ist Cir. 1991) (citing 19 GEORGE J. CoUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 79:385 (2d ed.
1983)).
144. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v, Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195, 1200 (1st Cir. 1994).
145. id.
146, Id. (citations omitted).
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was responsible for "establishing that the discharge of its waste was 'sudden and
accidental' under the exception to the pollution exclusion."'
' 47
The insurance policies between St. Paul and Warwick contained a pollution ex-
clusion clause which did not afford coverage for "property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants of waste materials unless
the discharge is 'sudden and accidental.' "" The important phrase of this clause is
"sudden and accidental," for it is an exception to the exclusion which would have
allowed Warwick to receive coverage for its claims.' 49 However, the district court
held that the "discharge of Warwick's wastes at the L & RR landfill was neither
sudden nor accidental and thus not covered under the policies. " 'o
The First Circuit agreed with the district court's holding on this issue. ' Noting
that courts are just about split down the middle as far as their interpretation of
"sudden and accidental,"'5 2 the First Circuit decided to forego the debate on
whether the term "sudden" is ambiguous. 5 3 The court of appeals adopted the posi-
tion adopted by almost all courts that the term" 'sudden and accidental,' means, at
the very least, 'unintended and unexpected.' ,,'I' Thus, the court did not find it
necessary to determine whether or not "sudden" is an ambiguous term; it simply
agreed with the district court on its interpretation and application of "sudden and
accidental" and upheld the summary judgment granted to St. Paul."'
Warwick contended on appeal that the district court erred in finding that the
disposal of wastes at the L & RR Site was expected and intended and that Warwick
was, therefore, excluded from coverage. 1 6 Warwick's reasoning was that the rele-
vant discharge - the "subsequent escape of pollutants from the landfill into the sur-
rounding environment"- was unexpected and unintended and that St. Paul should
afford Warwick coverage for its claims. "'
To determine what was the relevant discharge, the First Circuit referred to the
clear language of the pollution exclusion clause in the insurance policy and con-
cluded that "the occurrence that must be sudden and accidental -or, for our pur-





151. Id. at 1201.
152. Id. at 1200. Some courts construe "sudden" to unambiguously mean" 'abrupt' or 'immediate.' "Id. This
interpretation favors the insurer since in most cases the common form of pollution is a "gradual release of pollu-
tants into the environment over an extended period of time" and, thus, coverage is barred. Id. An almost equal
number of courts interpret the exception to the pollution exclusion as providing coverage for these gradual re-
leases of pollutants. Id. The latter group of courts' interpretation of "sudden" is" 'unintended and unexpected.'
Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 1201. The court implied that it wasn't necessary to determine if the term "sudden" was ambiguous
since the interpretation the court did adopt offered the broadest possible coverage. See id. at 1201-02.





FIRST CIRCUIT PA TCHES JUDGE POSNER'S LEAK
land' from which the property damage arose. ' After considering the facts, the
court determined that the damage arose from the initial disposal of hazardous
waste materials into the L & RR Site, and, thus, the relevant discharge was this
disposal into the landfill.1"9 The court disagreed with Warwick that there was an
intermediate discharge that caused the harm to the environment.' Supporting
this point, the court distinguished the disposal of Warwick's waste into the landfill
from intermediate discharges, such as "ruptured or exploding tanks, leaking
drums, or even some sort of improper dumping of waste after its arrival at the
Site." 
161
Furthermore, the First Circuit rejected Warwick's argument that the term "dis-
charge" in the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous.' 62 The court character-
ized Warwick's argument merely as "an attempt to recast the damages in this case
as a separate discharge." 6 3 Noting once again that the "sudden and accidental" ex-
ception to the pollution exclusion focuses on the initial discharge and not the re-
sulting damages, the First Circuit determined that there could be no separate
discharge since the damage to the environment was "coterminous" with the subse-
quent release of pollutants from the L & RR Site to the environment.1 4 Otherwise,
the court stated, the "distinction established between intentional and expected
damages and intentional and expected discharges" would be "eviscerated.""6
The First Circuit rejected Warwick's argument that the "landfill [was] some
type of container, like a storage tank, which did not discharge its contents into the
environment until some unforeseen, unexpected releasing event occurred."'
Supporting its position, the court related that the EPA was concerned with the
wastes placed in the L & RR Site, not the landfill's failure to contain the hazardous
substances.' 67 Also, the First Circuit distinguished the facts of the instant case
from those of the recent case in the Seventh Circuit' 68-Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Insurance Co. ' 9 In Patz, the insured had dug a pit in the earth to serve as a
"containment vessel" for its hazardous wastes. 70 Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, held that it was possible that there was a "separate unexpected
discharge of pollutants subsequent to the placement of waste into the pit."' 7' In the
instant case, ACME actually removed the waste from containers and subse-
158. Id. at 1203.
159. Id. at 1203-04.






166. Id. at 1205.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. 15 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1994).
170. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195, 1205 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing
Patz, 15 F.3d at 703-05).
171. Id.
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quently dumped it "literally onto the land" at the L & RR Site; this was the dis-
charge that resulted in contamination.172
Warwick also contended on appeal that even if the disposal of wastes at the L &
RR site was the relevant discharge, the pollution exclusion was not triggered since
ACME, a third party waste hauler, actually made the discharge.173 The First Cir-
cuit quickly noted that many courts reject the argument that the pollution exclu-
sion clause only applies to active polluters:174 "[Tihere is no meaningful
distinction between arranging for waste to be hauled off for disposal and actually
disposing of the waste in a landfill." '175 The First Circuit stated that the pollution
exclusion clause bars coverage for damage that occurs from the discharge. 76 De-
termining who made the actual discharge was not a relevant factor since the clause
did not specify that only discharges made by the insured were excluded. 77
As to Warwick's intentions and expectations, the record showed that Warwick
was unaware of the disposal details- how and where the wastes were being dis-
charged-but it was clear that Warwick expected and intended that its wastes
would be " 'taken care of " by ACME.178 After collecting the wastes from
Warwick's west plant, ACME chose the landfill, a "sufficiently common. . . des-
tination for the disposal of waste," and disposed of the waste by pouring it directly
onto the ground, which was not found to be an improper method of disposal.179
ACME did not do anything surprising or unusual in disposing of the waste; thus,
the disposal was consistent with Warwick's intentions and expectations."'
In conclusion of its debate on the various issues that arise under the pollution
exclusion clause, the First Circuit adopted the district court's determination that
Warwick was barred from coverage by the pollution exclusion clause: Warwick's
discharge of waste at the L & RR Site, the relevant discharge, was not unexpected
and unintended, and, thus, Warwick did not fall within the "sudden and acciden-
tal" exception to the clause. 181
V. ANALYSIS
"The fierce struggle between insurers and insureds has caused practically every
word of the insurance policy to receive careful scrutiny . "..."182 Traditionally,
the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion clause has been the
172. Id. at 1203, 1205.
173. Id. at 1205.
174. Id. at 1201-02.
175. Id. at 1202.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1202-03.
180. Id. at 1203.
181. Id.
182. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, § 8.01, at 8-3.
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"key battleground" in insurance claims involving hazardous waste liability.183 Now
it seems that even the word "discharge" in the pollution exclusion clause has joined
the ranks of ambiguous terms.
"Discharge" is defined in one dictionary as "to pour forth; emit;" to illustrate the
meaning of "discharge," that dictionary also uses the word discharge in an example
phrase, the example being "to discharge oil." '184 This interpretation is one most
likely favored by the insurer since it more distinctly describes the act of insureds
discharging wastes into pits dug into the earth. Insureds, however, also use dictio-
nary definitions and rely on a "semantic analysis" to contend that the terms dis-
charge, dispersal, release and escape "impl[y] the act of being freed from
containment." 185 For instance, another dictionary's definition of discharge is "to
release from confinement. "186 Insureds favor this particular definition which more
likely lends support to insureds' contentions that they responsibly placed wastes
into containers, such as evaporation pits, but that the wastes suddenly and acciden-
tally were released from the containers at some later time. 187 Urging that the
courts adopt this interpretation of discharge, policyholders have argued that dis-
charge is an ambiguous term that should be construed against the insurer who
drafted the policy's language. 
188
Is discharge an ambiguous term? In Hartford, the Tenth Circuit noted the Third
Circuit's warning that "the existence of numerous dictionary definitions [did not]
require[ ] a finding of ambiguity." 89 As the First Circuit advised in the instant
case, courts should not "seek out ambiguity" but should rather give the "plain eve-
ryday meaning" to words used in an insurance policy. 9 Also, the Tenth Circuit in
Broderick opined on the method of constructing an interpretation of discharge and
stated that the term "must be read in the context of the remainder of the language
of the clause."191
The original intent of the pollution exclusion clause "was to exclude the day-to-
day type pollution activities and not true accidents."1 92 On a daily basis, manufac-
183. Id. § 8.04[7], at 8-23. See also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162,
1195 & nn.60-61 (3d Cir. 1991 ) which is the authority most courts cite when noting that there is almost an even
split among the courts in their interpretation of the terms "sudden" and "accidental." See, e.g., Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1488 (10th Cir.) (Hunter, District Judge,
sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
184. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 377 (rev. ed. 1988).
185. Defense Practice Seminar, supra note 68, at A-42.
186. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 360 (1987).
187. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Gregory Reynolds, Comprehensive General Liability Policy Coverage of CERCLA Cleanup
Costs: A Proposed Guide to Interpretation, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, (1991). See also St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195, 1204 (1st Cir. 1994).
189. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir.)
(Hunter, District Judge, sitting by designation) (citing New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
933 F.2d 1162, 1193 (3d Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
190. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F3d 1195, 1199 (1st Cir. 1994).
191. Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 607 (10th Cir.) (Bratton,
District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
192. Interview with Lydia C. Warren, CPCU, Senior Insurance Counsel for Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Company, in Jackson, Miss. (Jan. 10, 1995).
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turing and other types of industries which create hazardous wastes as a by-product
use various disposal methods to get rid of their waste materials. Thus, by employ-
ing the advice from the circuit courts mentioned above, we may determine that the
unambiguous term "discharge," when read in context with the other three terms
"dispersal, release or escape" and the most significant phrase "into or upon the
land," has the everyday meaning "to get rid of; to dispose of."
Prior to the instant case, two Tenth Circuit opinions had consistently inter-
preted "discharge" to have a meaning similar to the everyday meaning discussed
above. First, in Broderick, Judge Tacha held that the "common sense, plain mean-
ing" of discharge unequivocally describes insured's initial act of disposing waste
materials into a pit dug into the earth.193 Approximately four months after Bro-
derick, Judge Moore reasserted in Hartford the Tenth Circuit's position that dis-
posing of wastes into an unlined earthen pit is discharging wastes into the land.194
Concurring with this precedent set by the Tenth Circuit, the First Circuit in the
present case also interpreted discharge to mean the act of dumping wastes into the
land at the L & RR Site.19 The Warwick Court even stated that the term discharge
is unambiguous. 196 From the courts' interpretations set out above, we can conclude
(1) discharge is indeed unambiguous; and (2) the Tenth and First Circuits agree on
the plain, everyday meaning of this term. Chief Judge Posner's opinion in Patz,
however, disrupts the consistency which lends itself to the unambiguous analysis
and interpretation of discharge.
In Patz, Posner did not define discharge as the initial act of placing waste mate-
rials into an unlined earthen pit; on the contrary, Posner viewed the initial place-
ment of wastes into a pit as merely filling a container with waste materials.
197
Posner characterized the evaporation pit as a container since clay soil, which is a
"building material," formed the pit's floor.199 Therefore, pollutants did not dis-
charge into the land until the defective container, the pit, leaked its contents into
the surrounding environment.199 Prior to Patz, Judge Tacha in Broderick expressly
rejected the insured's contentions that unlined pits in the ground were better char-
acterized as containers and, hence, placing waste materials into the pits was not a
discharge into the land."' Judge Tacha held that discharging wastes into the un-
lined pits is still a discharge into the land even if the insured was correct in his de-
scription of the pits as containers.2"' Similarly, in the instant case the First Circuit
193. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
195. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195, 1204 (1st Cir. 1994).
196. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
198. Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
199. Id. at 703-04.
200. Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601,607-08 (10th Cir.) (Bratton,
District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
201.Id. at 607 & n.5.
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did not find support for Warwick's argument that "the landfill [was] some type of
container.""'
The First Circuit distinguished the situation in the instant case from the one in
Patz on the basis that Warwick had removed the waste material from containers
before it disposed of it at the landfill. 2"3 This reasoning implies that the Patzes'
waste water flowed directly into the pit and was not first placed into a container
and then carried to the pit. The facts of the Patz case do not clearly support this
implication ;204 thus, the distinction stated by the First Circuit is not one that can be
relied upon to explain Posner's divergence from what otherwise seems like a con-
sistent interpretation of the term discharge.
In the instant case, the First Circuit described Warwick's argument that the
meaning of discharge was ambiguous as "merely an attempt to recast the damages
in this case as a separate discharge."2"' Although Posner did not explicitly an-
nounce discharge as ambiguous, the First Circuit's characterization of Warwick's
argument also suits Posner's interpretation of discharge.
In Patz, Posner shifted his focus and the focus of the sudden and accidental ex-
ception to the secondary discharge- the subsequent leakage of contaminants from
the evaporation pit.2" 6 Interestingly, the secondary discharge was coterminous
with the damage -the groundwater contamination;20 7 there was no "separate...
discharge of pollutants subsequent" to the leakage from the pit.208 By focusing his
attention on the result instead of the act, Posner, therefore, eviscerated the neces-
sary distinction between the discharge and the resulting damage.
The purpose of the pollution exclusion clause's exception was to provide cover-
age for acts (discharges) which were unintentional; whether or not insured in-
tended and expected to damage the surrounding environment is irrelevant.20 9 "The
focus of the pollution exclusion is on the point in time when contaminants are re-
leased or discharged into the environment[;]. . .[t]heir behavior after that time is
irrelevant to a determination of 'sudden and accidental.' "210 The First Circuit in
the instant case asserted this same position in its opinion: "[W]hat must be sudden
and accidental is the discharge and not the resulting damages.'211 The three recent
judicial opinions-Broderick, Hartford, and Warwick-have all addressed this is-
202. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195, 1203, 1205 (1st Cir. 1994).
203. Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1205.
204. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Patz, 15 F.3d 699, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1994).
205. Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1204.
206. See Patz, 15 F.3d at 703 -05.
207. Id.
208. Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1205.
209. Interview with Lydia C. Warren, supra note 192.
210. Defense Practice Seminar, supra note 69, at A-44.
211. Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1204.
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sue and agree that whether or not the insured intended for its discharge to cause
damage is irrelevant.212
As stated above, Posner shifted the focus from the initial act to the resulting
damage -the secondary discharge; with this shift, Posner avoided the work of de-
tailing an analysis of the interpretation of sudden and accidental and found cover-
age for the insured under the sudden and accidental exception. Posner commented
that enterprises, such as the Patz family business, do not intentionally pollute their
own land and cause damage.213 Unlike Posner, the First Circuit in the instant case
focused on the insured's actions and held that the initial discharge of wastes into
the landfill was the relevant discharge for purposes of the sudden and accidental
exception. In Warwick, the circuit court held that unless there is a separate dis-
charge between the initial discharge and the resulting damage,214" 'only the initial
release is relevant to the sudden and accidental inquiry.' "215 The First Circuit re-
lied also on Judge Tacha's opinion in Broderick to support its holding that
Warwick's initial discharge of pollutants into the landfill was the relevant discharge
under the pollution exclusion clause.216 Posner's opinion, therefore, is remarkable
because it rejects the basic premise established by the Tenth Circuit in Broderick
and later followed by the Warwick Court- the premise that the initial act of placing
waste materials into an earthen pit is the relevant discharge under the pollution ex-
clusion.
The explicit language of the pollution exclusion clause lends little support to the
"'secondary discharge'" argument; for the clause says it will bar coverage for
damage" 'arising out of the discharge of contaminants into the surrounding en-
vironment."' After the initial discharge of pollutants into the environment, any
subsequent release would certainly "arise out of" the initial introduction of wastes
and "would not trigger coverage if the initial release was not both 'sudden and acci-
dental.' "218
The three cases discussed above and other sources agree that the placement of
wastes into an unlined earthen pit is a "discharge into or upon the land." It seems
that Posner's opinion in Patz is the rebel which creates ambiguity for the term "dis-
charge." Posner's analysis is certainly very creative, but it is not cogent. In agree-
ing with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of discharge in Broderick and Hartford,
the First Circuit correctly decided the instant case and held for the insurer.
212. Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601,607 (10th Cir.) (Bratton,
District Judge, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1491 (10th Cir. 1992) (Hunter, District Judge, sitting by
designation); Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1205.
213. Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1994).
214. Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1204 (internal quotations omitted).
215. Id. at 1205 (quoting A. Johnson & Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 933 F.2d 66, 72 & n.9 (1st
Cir. 1991)).
216. See id. at 1204-05.
217. Defense Practice Seminar, supra note 69, at A-45.
218. Id.
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It appears that Judge Posner's reasoning in Patz was driven by a particular mo-
tive- perhaps to find coverage for the insured under the exception to the pollution
exclusion. The insureds, however, are not affected by the court's decision to
choose one interpretation over the other.219 For example, a court's interpretation of
discharge which favors the insured will not give manufacturing and other types of
industries a disincentive to handle wastes properly. Since already "coverage is ex-
pensive and difficult to acquire" in this area, insureds cannot rely on predictions
that the court will rule in their favor.22
If all courts, including the First Circuit in Warwick, adopted Judge Posner's in-
terpretation of the term "discharge," then the insurance industry would become li-
able to reimburse various parties millions, and possibly even billions, of dollars for
the costs the parties incurred as a result of cleaning up hazardous waste contami-
nants caused by the insureds' actions. The other effects of this interpretation on the
insurance industry, surprisingly, do not compare to the industry's enormous mone-
tary liability. For example, an interpretation of the term "discharge" which favors
the insured will not lead to the eventual demise of insurance for bodily injury and
property damage; however, such an interpretation will foster a need for the indus-
try to revise the pollution exclusion with even "tighter" language. 21 Therefore,
there will still be coverage for incidents occurring outside polluting events, "but
then it becomes necessary to define what is a polluting event"22 - and, yet, even
another battleground for ambiguity is created.223
219. Interview with Lydia C. Warren, supra note 192.
220. Id.
221. Id. To avoid future losses, the insurance industry could tighten the language of the pollution exclusion by
including the terms "initial" and "placement" in the clause. Thus, the re-drafted clause would read:
[I]t is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the [ini-
tial placement,] discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if [the
initial placement,] discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, § 8,02[1], at 8-6 to 8-7.
222. Interview with Lydia C. Warren, supra note 192.
223. Halfway through the 1980s, insurance companies revised the pollution exclusion clause. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 7, § 8.04[7], at 8-26. The new version was referred to as the "absolute" pollution exclusion: it
excluded specific types of pollution from coverage and qualified the exclusion with the language "whether or not
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden or accidental." Id. § 8.04[7] & n. 90, at 8-26 to 8-27. The
more restrictive absolute pollution exclusion limited the insurance industry's liability to afford coverage for its
policyholders' pollution incidents and eliminated the need for debate over the interpretation of sudden and acci-
dental. See id. § 8.04[7], at 8-26.
Although in the mid- I 980s the insurance industry revised the pollution exclusion clause to be absolute - with-
out any exceptions such as sudden and accidental exception, "policyholders (and courts) have become more crea-
tive" in arguing that this exclusion is not absolute, but that its application has limitations. Defense Practice
Seminar, supra note 69, at A-53.
It is rumored that certain groups in the insurance industry are looking at the "possibility of drafting a new pollu-
tion exclusion clause that will provide coverage for at least a limited range of pollution incidents." ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW, supra note 7, § 8.04[7], at 8-26 to 8-27. Whether or not the groups will succeed in creating another
new version of the pollution exclusion clause remains to be seen. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The pollution exclusion clause from the 1970s is only a partial exclusion which
has caused a great deal of confusion.224 Cases which require courts to interpret the
1970s version of the pollution exclusion clause continue to occupy the courts.
225
Although courts generally agree that the focus of the pollution exclusion clause is
on the insured's initial actions and not the resulting damage,226 the split of author-
ity among state courts which have interpreted the terms "sudden" and "accidental"
indicates that the states' courts, and thus the federal courts, will never agree upon
one accepted interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause. 227 From this it fol-
lows that judicial opinions on the interpretations of discharge also will continue to
be inconsistent. In the federal courts of appeals, other factors besides precedent
affect the courts' decisions whether or not to rule in favor of the insured- factors
such as hidden motives or revealed biases and the imposition of state law. Since
contract interpretation is a matter of state law, the United States Supreme Court
will not be able to resolve this conflict.228 Insurers and their policy holders can
hope only for certainty in their respective states as state appellate courts give more
rulings on this issue.229
224. JohnS. Vishneski, III et al., The Insurance Industry's 1970 Pollution Exclusion: An Exercise in Ambiguity,
23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 67, 69 (1991).
225. Id.
226. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
227. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, § 8.0417], at 8-26.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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